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Case No. 20101022 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Charles Howard Williams, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for assault-domestic violence and two counts 
of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, all class A misdemeanors. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008). < 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: After a jury found Defendant guilty of domestic violence related crimes, 
the victim recanted her trial testimony. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing 
to arrest judgment where Defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence at 
trial? 
Standard of Review. When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of 
arrest of judgment, the Court reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
Weisberg, 2002 UT App 434,113, 62 P.3d 457 (citing State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8111, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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994 P.2d 177). The Court will sustain the trial court's decision unless the jury verdict is 
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that all 
reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt. Id. at ^ f 13. 
Issue 2: The trial court found the victim's post-trial recantation to be incredible 
because it was contradicted by the prosecutor, the victim advocate, the court record, and 
the victim's prior statement to the police. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on the victim's recantation? 
Standard of Review. "It is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has 
broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial." State v. Redding, 2007 UT 
App 350,1f 8, 172 P.3d 319 (quoting Smith v. Fairfax Realty\ Inc., 2003 UT 41, ^ 25, 82 
P.3d 1064). This Court may reverse the trial court's decision on a motion for new trial 
only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Id. 
Issue 3: The trial court found the testimony from the prosecutor and victim 
advocate to be credible despite the victim's allegations of intimidation. Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
Standard of Review. The Court will review the denial of Defendant's motion for a 
new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. State v. Wengreen, 
2007 UT App 264, ^  10, 167 P.3d 516 (citing State v. Tilt, 2004 UT App 395, If 11, 101 
P.3d838). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
On March 31, 2009 the State charged Defendant with one count of Assault against a 
Pregnant Person, two counts of Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a 
Child, and one count of Terroristic Threats, all misdemeanors. R. 1-2. On June 16, 2010, 
a jury convicted Defendant of all counts except the Terroristic Threats. R. 65-67. Five 
days after the verdict, the victim, Alecia Belt, filed a written affidavit indicating that she 
had lied about the incident in her original police statement and in her testimony at trial. 
R. 70-74. As a result, Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment on August 16, 2010, in 
which he sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. R. 77. After taking 
evidence and receiving briefing and argument, the court denied defendant's motion. R. 
125-127. Defendant was sentenced on January 10, 2011, to a two-year term of probation 
that included forty-five days in jail. R. 146-148. Defendant timely appealed. 
B. Statement of Facts 
On March 6, 2009, Defendant threatened, berated, and kicked Alecia Belt in front 
of their two children as she was on the phone with a nurse concerning her pregnancy. R. 
151:101-108. At trial, Ms. Belt testified against Defendant who was ultimately convicted 
by a jury for several domestic violence offenses stemming from this incident. R. 65-67. 
The day following verdict, Ms. Belt received a warning on Facebook to "better sleep with 
one eye open bitch, the bad guy just got out of jail." R. 106, 152: 53-54. That same day, 
she was also terminated from her job after an anonymous complaint was filed against her. 
R. 106, 152:54-56. Three days later, Ms. Belt recanted her testimony. R. 70-73. 
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1. The Assault 
Ms. Belt was at home on March 6th, 2009 waiting for her doctor's office to return 
her call. R. 151:101. Ms. Belt and Defendant had been in a relationship for 
approximately three years and she was three and a half months pregnant with their third 
child. R. 151:98-99. On this day, she was feeling miserable with out of control back 
pain due to her pregnancy. R. 151:101. Defendant and their two children were home with 
Ms. Belt as she awaited her doctor's office to call. R. 151:99. Ms. Belt was sitting at the 
computer desk in the kitchen when Defendant decided to talk about an unpaid bill. R. 
151:101-102. Defendant was mad and asked Ms. Belt "why the fuck wasn't this bill 
paid?" R. 151:103. Defendant became more loud and confrontational and threatened to 
evict Ms. Belt from the house. R. 151:104. 
While Defendant continued berating Ms. Belt, a nurse from her doctor's office 
called. R. 151:105. Ms. Belt began describing her symptoms to the nurse while 
Defendant called her a "lying bitch" and continued to interrupt her conversation with the 
nurse. R. 151:105-106. As her conversation with the nurse continued, Defendant kicked 
Ms. Belt in the leg. R. 151:106. The kick caused and abrasion and pain to her leg as it 
was already swollen from the pregnancy. R. 151:106. Ms. Belt yelled at Defendant 
"don't ever fucking kick me again," causing the nurse to ask her if everything was okay. 
R. 151:108. The nurse then told Ms. Belt that she was calling the police. R. 151:108. 
After kicking Ms. Belt, Defendant began to collect some things to leave. R. 151:108. On 
his way out the door, he told someone he was speaking to on the phone that "he was 
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going to jail for murder because he was going to put a bullet in [Ms. Belt's] head." R. 
151:111. 
Officer Julius with the Unified Policed Department responded to the home to 
investigate the incident after a third party called in to report it. R. 151:157. Upon 
arriving, she observed Ms. Belt to be "somewhat shaken, a little distraught." R. 151:159. 
Further, she observed an abrasion on Ms. Belt's leg and had it photographed by an 
evidence technician. R. 151:159. After questioning Ms. Belt about what had just 
occurred, she had her complete a witness statement. R. 86-87. Defendant was not on 
scene during Officer Julius'investigation. R. 151:160. 
In her witness statement, Ms. Belt described the incident in detail. She wrote 
about Defendant yelling profanities at her while she was on the phone with the nurse, and 
described Defendant kicking her. R. 87. She further described the threats Defendant 
made to her as he left their home. R. 87. She signed the statement, certifying that it was 
true, accurate, and complete to the best of her knowledge. R. 87. 
2. The Jury Trial 
During Defendant's jury trial, Ms. Belt's testimony remained consistent with her 
original statement to the police. She told the jury that Defendant had berated and yelled 
at her while she spoke with a nurse from the doctor's office. R. 87, 151:105-106. She 
recounted how the nurse asked her what was wrong during the commotion. R. 87, 
151:106-108. Finally, she stated that Defendant had kicked her in the leg, causing her to 
cry. R. 87, 151:107-108. Throughout the course of the trial, Ms. Belt testified from her 
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memory. Only once near the end of her direct examination did the prosecutor have to 
refresh her recollection with her original statement. R. 151:109-110. 
Ms. Belt's testimony on cross-examination was also consistent with her testimony 
during direct examination. For example, her testimony with respect to her phone call 
with the nurse during her argument with Defendant remained consistent. R. 151:125-
126. Further, her testimony remained consistent with respect to Defendant kicking her 
leg. R. 151:127. She also added that she was living off and on with Defendant between 
February 2010 and the trial date. R. 151:131-133. In May 2010, she stopped staying 
with Defendant because she had received a subpoena for the jury trial and was told by the 
Defendant that they were "done" if she appeared. R. 151:133. 
Defendant testified on his own behalf. His testimony was consistent in several 
respects with Ms. Belt's testimony. He confirmed that there was an argument over an 
unpaid bill and that he was irate and called her names. R. 151:168-169. He also 
acknowledged that he was "a little bit more louder, a little bit more bold" as they argued. 
R. 151:171-172. Defendant denied kicking Ms. Belt and could not explain how she 
sustained the injury to her leg. R. 151:183. 
At no point during Ms. Belt's testimony at trial did she accuse the prosecutor of 
threatening her or forcing her to lie. Instead, Ms. Belt stated that she felt "a lot of hatred" i 
toward Defendant and that she came to court at her own choice. R. 151:151-152. 
Further, Ms. Belt testified on cross examination that she was reluctant to testify because 
she was afraid and was worried about herself and her children. R. 151:152. Ms. Belt 
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never said anything to indicate that her testimony and her prior statements were 
untruthful. 
3. The Recantation 
Defendant was convicted by the jury on one count of Assault and two counts of 
Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child. R. 65-67. The day 
following trial, Ms. Belt received a message through Facebook message that stated 
"[BJetter sleep with one eye open bitch, the bad guy just got out of jail." R. 106, 152: 53-
54. Further, at the end of her shift at work that day, she was terminated due to a 
telephonic complaint accusing her of improperly accessing confidential information. R. 
106, 152:54-56. Three days later, on June 21st, 2010 Ms. Belt filed an affidavit with the 
court claiming that she lied to the police and accusing the prosecution of forcing her to lie 
at trial. R. 70-74. 
a. The Affidavit 
In her affidavit, Ms. Belt claimed that she lied to police in her original statement 
and to the jury while she was on the stand. R. 73. She claimed that prior to trial, she had 
told the prosecutor, Jaclyn Crawmer, that nothing really happened and she had only 
written the statement to police "out of hatred." R. 70. She asserted that on the day of trial 
before entering the courtroom she had fallen to her knees screaming and crying and 
saying that nothing happened. At this point, Ms. Belt claimed Ms. Crawmer physically 
forced her into the courtroom and told her that if she refused to testify she would be 
subjected to a second degree felony. R. 70-71. During the trial, she alleged that Ms. 
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Crawmer instructed her to read her written statement to police verbatim, which was why 
she "put [the] statement in front of [her]." R. 72. 
Based on this affidavit, Defendant filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment. R. 77. 
Attached to Defendant's motion was an additional affidavit authored by Ms. Belt dated 
June 24, 2010 - eight days after the verdict. R. 94. In that affidavit, Ms. Belt provided a 
different explanation as to how she sustained her leg injury. R. 94. She claimed that it 
occurred when she and Defendant were moving a coffee table in their home and that she 
had lied to police officers because she was mad at Defendant. R. 94. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion for arrest of 
judgment and new trial. R. 152. At that hearing, Ms. Belt admitted that her testimony at 
trial was consistent with her original statement to the police. R. 152:9. She asserted, 
however, that a process server and Ms. Crawmer told her that if she did not respond to 
her subpoena she would go to jail. R. 152:17-19. 
Despite these alleged warnings, Ms. Belt claimed that she intended on the morning 
of trial to go to work and not to testify. R. 152:29. Her plans were thwarted, however, 
when she received a call from Ms. Crawmer who allegedly threatened that if she did not 
appear in court, she would have somebody pick her up and her children would be turned 
over to the State. R. 152:19-20. During this conversation, Ms. Belt allegedly told Ms. 
Crawmer that she could not testify against Defendant because the charges were not 
correct. R. 152:21. Nevertheless, Ms. Belt went to court and waited in a conference 
room outside of the courtroom with her sister and a victim advocate until Ms. Crawmer 
came to introduce her to the jury. R. 152:22. 
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Ms. Belt further claimed that when she was summoned into the courtroom her 
knees buckled and she fell. R. 152:22. She purportedly screamed at the top of her lungs 
"no, I cannot do this, I'm not going to testify against him!" R. 152:22. She claimed that 
the victim advocate then picked her up off the ground and she fell again. R. 152:22. Ms. 
Crawmer then allegedly emerged, grabbed her, and pushed her twice in the back as they 
entered both sets of doors into the courtroom. R. 152:23. Ms. Belt introduced herself to 
the jury and then returned to the conference room. R. 152:23. 
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Belt allegedly suffered a similar breakdown as she was 
summoned back into the courtroom to testify against Defendant. R. 152:24. She claimed 
Ms. Crawmer again physically picked her up by her arm and pulled her through the 
courtroom's double doors. R. 152:24. As they entered the courtroom, Ms. Crawmer was 
allegedly pushing her lower back with one hand and instructing her not to look at 
Defendant or his attorney. MH, 24. 
At the beginning of her testimony, Ms. Belt claimed that Ms. Crawmer placed her 
witness statement to the police in front of her so that she could read it when questions 
were asked. R. 152:24. In addition, Ms. Crawmer allegedly instructed Ms. Belt to keep 
watching her and that she would nod if she wanted her to provide more detail in her 
answers. R. 152:25. 
Ms. Belt then offered some explanations as why some of her testimony at trial was 
not truthful. She claimed she was never in fear of Defendant despite her testimony 
otherwise at trial. R. 152:30. She further reaffirmed that that the abrasion she had on her 
leg was actually caused by a coffee table she was moving when she and Defendant were 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rearranging furniture. R. 152:31. She claimed that after the injury she had to "hurry up 
and put, like, peroxide on it and Neosporin, because it started stinging." R. 152:31. 
b. Evidence to Support the Recantation 
The only evidence offered in support of Ms. Belt's testimony was the testimony of 
Defendant's mother, Jeanie Williams. After Ms. Belt's testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing, Defendant's attorney advised the trial court that Jeanie Williams wished to 
testify about what she recalled occurring during the jury trial. R. 152:70-71. Defendant's 
attorney acknowledged that Ms. Williams was not disclosed as a witness prior to the 
hearing, and consequently was excluded from the courtroom during Ms. Belt's testimony. 
R. 152:75. 
Ms. Williams testified that she sat in the back row throughout the course of the 
jury trial, approximately two feet from the doors. R. 152:73-74. She explained that she 
heard Ms. Belt crying outside of the courtroom and observed Ms. Crawmer go outside to 
see what was happening. R. 152:75. Ms. Williams only heard Ms. Belt cry that she did 
not want to go into court once that morning, and that she could not hear what the other 
parties were saying. R. 152:75-76.l 
c. Evidence Refuting Ms. Belt's Recantation 
In response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment, Ms. Crawmer provided an 
affidavit detailing her recollection of events and testified at the evidentiary hearing. R. 
1
 Defendant's aunt, Carol Crow, also testified at the evidentiary hearing in a similar 
manner as Ms. Williams. R. 152:77-84. The trial court struck her testimony, finding it 
cumulative and suspect as she was not subject to the exclusionary rule during the 
testimony of both Ms. Belt and Ms. Williams. 
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103-107, 152:87. Ms. Crawmer explained that she had met with Ms. Belt on two 
occasions prior to the jury trial. R. 104. She described the first visit as brief and 
confirmed that Ms. Belt's statement was consistent during that visit with what transpired 
during the incident. R. 104. She described her second visit as a meeting with Ms. Belt 
the day prior to trial with a victim advocate intern, Michael Riquino, at the District 
Attorney's office. R. 104. At that meeting, Ms. Belt confirmed her previous statement 
and made no indication that she had fabricated anything against Defendant. R. 104. She 
expressed fear of Defendant and advised Ms. Crawmer that he had outstanding warrants. 
R. 104. Ms. Crawmer stated that she never threatened prosecution against Ms. Belt if she 
did not appear to testify. R. 152:87. 
Ms. Crawmer indicated that on the morning of trial she received a phone call from 
Ms. Belt who stated that she was in the parking lot but afraid to come up because of 
Defendant. R. 105. Ms. Belt ultimately came upstairs and was accompanied by her sister 
for emotional support. R. 105. Ms. Belt never told Ms. Crawmer that she had lied to 
police. Rather, she expressed fear of Defendant. R. 105. Ms. Crawmer denied ever 
physically lifting Ms. Belt off the ground and forcing her into the courtroom to testify 
against her will. R. 152:88. During trial, Ms. Crawmer recalled providing Ms. Belt with 
her witness statement towards the end to refresh her recollection with respect to a threat 
Defendant made as he was leaving. R. 105. She denied ever instructing Ms. Belt to read 
her written statement verbatim to the jury. R. 152:87. 
Ms. Crawmer stated that the morning after trial she received a call from Ms. Belt 
describing the threatening Facebook message she received from a mutual friend of her 
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and the Defendant. R. 106. The next day, Ms. Belt again called her and told her that she 
was suspended from her job because one of Defendant's friends called her employer and 
stated that she improperly accessed confidential information. R. 106. Ms. Crawmer 
described Ms. Belt as being distraught because she was concerned about getting money to 
support her children. R. 106. Defendant's attorney elected not to cross examine Ms. 
Crawmer's testimony or her statement in her affidavit. R. 152:89. 
In addition to Ms. Crawmer's testimony, the State also called Michael Riquino, 
the victim advocate intern who assisted Ms. Crawmer. R. 152:89. Mr. Riquino testified 
that he was working as an intern for the District Attorney's office at the time of 
Defendant's jury trial. R. 152:90. He indicated that in this case, he was assisting Ms. 
Crawmer by helping Ms. Belt through the court process. R. 152:90. Mr. Riquino was 
present with Ms. Belt and Ms. Crawmer at the District Attorney's office prior to trial and 
did not recall Ms. Belt stating that she falsified her allegations against the Defendant, or 
that anything different occurred on the night in question. R. 152:90-91. 
At trial, Mr. Riquino remained with Ms. Belt and her sister during the jury trial. R. 
109. He testified that no physical force was used at anytime by Ms. Crawmer or himself 
to force Ms. Belt into the courtroom. R. 152:91. Further, he stated that Ms. Belt was 
simply advised to tell the truth when it concerned her testimony. R. 152:91. He testified 
that Ms. Belt did express fear about seeing Defendant in court because of the assault. R. 
152:92. Specifically, Mr. Riquino stated that Ms. Belt would ask him to check the 
hallways whenever she wished to use the bathroom because she was afraid of seeing 
Defendant. R. 152:94. . 
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4. Trial Court's Findings 
After considering the evidence and hearing argument, the trial court denied 
Defendant's motions for arrest of judgment and new trial. R. 153. In its decision, the 
trial court found that Ms. Belt's post trial testimony had "changed dramatically from the 
time of the trial" and that it lacked credibility. R. 153:13. The trial court further found 
the testimony of Ms. Williams to be biased and not helpful. R. 153:13. 
With respect to Ms. Crawmer's testimony, the trial court found it to be credible 
and reliable because it supported the regularity of the jury verdict. R. 153:14. Further, 
the trial court did not find any prosecutorial misconduct with regard to Ms. Crawmer's 
presentation of the case. R. 153:14. The trial court found Mr. Riquino's testimony to be 
disinterested and supportive of the regularity of the jury verdict. R. 153:14. As such, it 
found the testimony to be significant because he was the only witness who did not have a 
side in the matter. R. 153:14. Based on these factual findings, the trial court determined 
that Defendant did not meet the legal requirements necessary to arrest judgment or be 
awarded a new trial. R. 153:14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to arrest judgment because the 
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. A trial court 
should only arrest judgment when the evidence presented to the jury was so inconclusive 
or so inherently improbable that they should have entertained a reasonable doubt as to a 
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specific element of the crime. Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
sustain Defendant's conviction because Ms. Belt's trial testimony was consistent with her 
original statement to police and supported by corroborative evidence. Consideration of 
her post-trial recantation in an arrest of judgment determination is inappropriate because 
it was not considered by the jury. Defendant's attempt to permit such consideration 
under the "other good cause" provision of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is unsupported by, and inconsistent, with case law. 
Next, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence. The trial court has a wide range of discretion in assessing 
the credibility of newly discovered evidence when evaluating a motion for new trial. 
Evidence that lacks credibility will not tend to make a different result more probable at 
retrial. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Belt's recantation 
to lack credibility because it was motivated by threats and financial distress, highly 
suspect on its face, unsupported by corroborative evidence, and refuted by the State's 
evidence. This assessment of credibility is not abrogated by Ms. Belt's willingness to 
commit perjury, as suggested by Defendant. Instead, it is important that the trial court 
ensure that the new evidence is not influenced by external circumstances such as pity or 
intimidation before granting a convicted defendant a new trial. 
Finally, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion for new trial based on 
prosecutorial misconduct. The only evidence of prosecutorial misconduct was Ms. Belt's 
incredible post-trial recantation. The State presented sufficient evidence to refute Ms. 
Belt's claims and Defendant does not refute the trial court's finding that the State's 
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refuting evidence was credible and reliable. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Defendant's motion because there was simply no credible evidence 
of prosecutorial misconduct. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR ARREST OF JUDGEMENT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to arrest 
judgment. In support of his argument, he cites extensively to the post-trial evidence. 
Defendant's use of this evidence is misplaced. In considering a motion to arrest 
judgment, a court looks only to the evidence presented at trial. It does not consider post-
trial evidence. When the trial court's ruling is correctly viewed through only the trial 
evidence, it is apparent that the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion.2 
A. Post-trial evidence is not considered in an arrest of judgment 
because it was not considered by the jury. 
Under Utah law, the standard for determining whether a trial court correctly 
denied a motion for arrest of judgment is the same standard appellate courts apply in 
determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. State v. 
2
 The trial court's decision to deny Defendant's motions is vague as to its legal ground or 
theory. R. 153:14. Nevertheless, "an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed 
from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling 
or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory ... was not raised in the 
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 2001 UT 61, % 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (citations omitted). 
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Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, If 20, 20 P.3d 265 (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1993)). Under that standard, "a trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." Id. 
The inherent improbability standard does not extend to post-trial recantations 
when considering an arrest of judgment. In State v. Hoffhine, the defendant moved for 
both an arrest of judgment and for a new trial after a jury convicted him of aggravated 
robbery. Hoffhine at f^ 11. Hoffhine's motions were based on the victim's post-trial 
recantation of the certainty of his identification of Hoffhine during trial. Id. When the 
Utah Supreme Court considered his motion for arrest of judgment, it applied the inherent 
improbability standard. Id. at f^ 20. The court did not consider the victim's post-trial 
recantation in its analysis and looked only at the evidence presented to the jury. Id. at | 
21-23. Ultimately, the court found the evidence to be sufficient and affirmed the trial 
court's decision. Id. at f 23. 
The court's decision in Hoffhine to not consider the victim's post-trial recantation 
in its arrest of judgment analysis is consistent with other cases employing the inherent 
improbability standard. See e.g. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202-1204 (Utah 
App. 1991) (reviewing trial testimony in assessing whether trial court properly arrested 
judgment); State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ffl[ 22-25, 210 P.3d 288 (reviewing child 
victim's inconsistent and dubious testimony during trial to reverse denial of arrest of 
judgment); State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872, 876-877 (Utah App. 1998) (applying inherent 
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improbability standard to testimony presented at trial in reversing trial court's arrest of 
judgment). Accordingly, the inherent improbability standard is only applicable to 
testimony and evidence presented to the jury. Any post-trial evidence presented to the 
court should not be considered in determining whether an arrest of judgment is 
appropriate. 
A review of the record in this case demonstrates that Ms. Belt's testimony at trial 
remained consistent throughout. Ms. Belt testified on both direct and cross examination 
that Appellant kicked her and made threats to her. R. 151:105-107, 125-127. This 
testimony was further corroborated by photographic evidence of the injury she sustained 
to her leg as a result of being kicked, as well as Officer Julius' description of Ms. Belt 
being "distraught and shaken." R. 151:159. In addition, Defendant's own testimony 
during trial further corroborated portions of Ms. Belt's testimony in that they were both 
having a loud argument over an unpaid bill where he was a "little more bold." R. 
151:171. This evidence is conclusive and supportive of the jury's verdict. When 
applying the inherent improbability doctrine to this evidence, there is no indication that 
anything considered by the jury was "so inherently improbable that no reasonable mind 
could believe it." Workman, 806 P.2d at 1203 Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
trial court' s denial of Defendant' s motion to arrest judgment. 
B. Allowing a trial court to consider post-trial evidence when 
evaluating an arrest of judgment improperly invades the province 
ofthe jury. 
Defendant does not accept that the inherent improbability standard applies only to 
trial testimony. Instead, he seeks to extend its application to include post-trial evidence 
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by citing to the "other good cause" provision of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.3 Appellant's Brief, pg. 11. In effect, he is asserting that this provision should 
permit a trial judge to inject a post-trial recantation into the trial testimony and arrest 
judgment if that recantation makes the testimony "inherently improbable" or "apparently 
false."4 Appellant's Brief, pg. 11. Such a proposition, however, would give the trial 
court broad power to invade the province of the jury and is simply inconsistent with the 
original policy behind the inherent improbability standard. 
Trial courts are generally discouraged from substituting its judgment with that of 
the jury, and only should when the jury is presented with physically impossible or 
apparently false testimony. This policy is discussed in both Workman cases. In the first 
Workman case, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
"[A] court has the right, and indeed should exercise the duty, to arrest a 
judgment after a jury verdict in an appropriate case...In short, the legal 
mechanism of arresting a judgment is a firmly entrenched exception to the 
rule of law in a proper case that jurors are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. 
3
 Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "at any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence, the court, upon is own initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public 
offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment." Utah R. Crim. P. 23. 
4
 Defendant cites to State v. Robbins in support of this proposition. It is the State's 
position that Defendant misapplies Robbins because Robbins analyzed the testimony of a 
child victim during trial Robbins, 2009 UT 23, fflf 22-23. It was the child victim's trial 
testimony itself that was "inherently improbable" or "apparently false," and not some 
new post-trial discovery that then called it into question. Id. at fflf 18-24. Thus, Robbins 
does not stand for an expansion of the inherent improbability standard to post-trial 
evidence. 
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State v. Workman, 806 P.2d at 1203 (quoting State v. Meyers, 606 P.2d 250, 252-253 
(Utah 1980)(emphasis in original). In the second Workman case, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that in some unusual circumstances a reviewing court may reassess witness 
credibility at trial, but "[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or 
reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury 
verdict." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). (citing State v. Logan, 563 
P.2d811, 813-814 (Utah 1977). 
Put differently, a trial court should arrest judgment only when there is either a 
"physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity [is] apparent, without 
resort to inferences or deductions." Id. (citations omitted). It then follows that if a trial 
court is restrained from invading the province of the jury except in some "unusual" 
circumstances, then it should not be permitted to alter a jury's verdict based on evidence 
the jury did not even consider. This includes post-trial recantations. 
Yet, Defendant is asking this Court to expand the inherent improbability standard 
to include post-trial evidence under the "other good cause" provision of Rule 23. 
Defendant fails, however, to demonstrate why the "other good cause" provision of Rule 
23 justifies an expansion of the inherent improbability standard to include post trial 
evidence. Utah Courts have rarely addressed the meaning of "other good cause" 
contemplated under Rule 23.5 Further, the State is unaware of any Utah case upholding 
an arrest of judgment based on post-trial evidence. 
5
 Some mention of this provision is made in State v. Eldredge, 111 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
There, Eldredge argued that the trial court erred in refusing to order a new trial or arrest 
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Generally, such discoveries of post-trial evidence are better suited for a motion for 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence. In fact, the lone example cited by 
defendant, State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1988), supports this position. The 
Owens court relied on post-trial evidence in granting Owens a new trial. The court of 
appeals explained that the lower court "did not, in substance, grant an arrest of 
judgment." Id. at 978. Rather, "[t]he trial court looked beyond the record to the 
prosecutor's and witness's affidavits and found improper prosecutorial behavior 
warranting a new trial." Id. 
Accordingly, this Court should not entertain Defendant's request to extend the 
inherent improbability standard to include post-trial recantations pursuant to the "other 
good cause" provision of Rule 23. Such an extension would broaden the trial court's 
otherwise restrained power to invade the province of the jury. Further, it is unnecessary 
when a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may achieve the same 
goal. 
judgment. Id. at 38. He asserted that he was entitled to such relief because after his trial 
the State's expert witness stated he was unsure of defendant's guilt. Id. In its analysis, 
the court framed the issue under Rule 23 and Rule 24 as "whether the facts recited above 
constitute either good cause for the arrest of judgment or an error or impropriety that had 
a substantial effect on Eldredge's rights. Id. at 38. (emphasis added). Ultimately, the 
court quickly determined that the evidence would have been inadmissible and affirmed 
the trial court's denial of his motions without providing much explanation to the meaning 
of "other good cause." Id. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE NEW EVIDENCE WOULD NOT HAVE 
RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT OUTCOME ON RETRIAL. 
Defendant claims that the lower court erred in denying his motion for a new trial 
because Ms. Belt's recantation would have resulted in a different outcome on retrial. 
Defendant's claim is meritless. The trial court found Ms. Belt's post-trial recantation and 
testimony to be incredible, and Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal. It 
follows that Ms. Belt's recantation would not have altered the outcome on retrial. 
In order to receive a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence, 
Defendant must establish three criteria: (1) the evidence must be such as could not be 
reasonably discovered and produced at the trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and 
(3) it must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case. State 
v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 66, 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,111). 
A. Ms. Belt's recantation was so incredible it would not have rendered 
a different result more probable at retrial. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Belt's recantation lacked 
credibility. Appellate courts afford trial judges "a wide range of discretion" in 
determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants granting a new trial. State v. 
Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 66 (citations omitted). That deference is due "to the superior 
position the trial judge holds when assessing credibility of the new evidence, an essential 
component of the determination of whether the evidence would make a different result on 
retrial probable." Id. 
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The trial court's credibility determination when examining newly discovered 
evidence is a critical part of deciding a motion for a new trial. See State v. Loose, 2000 
UT 11,118, 994 P.2d 1237. There, Loose appealed the trial court's denial of his motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Id. at ^ 1. The newly discovered 
evidence at issue was a letter written by the victim after Loose was convicted at trial 
where she stated that she had lied on the stand. Id. at f^ 16. An evidentiary hearing took 
place where the victim maintained that her testimony during trial was truthful and that 
she had written the recantation in an effort to cause problems for her mother. Id. at ^ 17. 
On review, the Utah Supreme Court described the critical issue as "the trial court's 
resolution of the truthfulness of the recantation as a predicate for denying the new trial 
motion." Id. The Court advised caution when "a trial judge's weighing of credibility has 
the result of keeping otherwise admissible evidence from the jury." Id. at ^ 18. 
Nevertheless, the Court continued, stating: 
"[W]e conclude that it is appropriate in the context of a new trial motion based on 
newly discovered evidence to give the trial court the power to consider the 
testimony's probable weight as part of its determination as to whether that 
testimony would 'make a different result probable on retrial.' And part of that 
weight certainly is the likelihood that a jury would find it credible. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the 
motion for new trial because the victim would not recant under oath and provided a 
cogent explanation as to why she drafted the letter. Id. Accordingly, the trial court's 
credibility assessment of Ms. Belt's recantation is critical in determining whether it 
would render a different result probable at retrial. 
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1. Ms. Belt's recantation lacked credibility because it was made 
after she was subjected to threats and financial distress. 
Motives to provide a false recantation are particularly relevant in assessing 
credibility. In Hoffhine, the Utah Supreme Court applied the reasoning in Loose to the 
trial court's credibility assessment of a recanting victim when denying Hoffhine's motion 
for new trial. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ^ 28. A few weeks after Hoffhine was convicted, the 
victim presented a "Victim/Witness Complaint Form," claiming that he was now certain 
that Hoffhine was not the person who had robbed him. Id. at f^ 24. This statement was 
prepared a week or two after Hoffhine's brother called the victim to inform him of the 
conviction. Id. During the evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the victim 
looked at Hoffhine again and testified that he now he was not positive Hoffhine was not 
the perpetrator. Id. at 126. The victim also expressed feelings of guilt about Hoffhine's 
conviction because he was young. Id. 
In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court determined that the evidence 
was not such to render a different result probable on retrial because the victim's 
recantation lacked credibility. Id. at If 27. The trial court's credibility assessment hinged 
on the fact that the victim's recantation was influenced by Hoffhine's brother contacting 
him after the trial, and the fact that he felt responsible for putting a young person in 
prison. Id. In upholding the decision, the Utah Supreme Court applied its holding in 
Loose and held that the trial court was within the range of permitted discretion. Id. at ^ 
28. 
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As in Hoffhine, Ms. Belt's recantation was motivated by circumstances occurring 
after Defendant was convicted. The day following trial, she received a Facebook 
message from a mutual friend of Defendant stating that she "better sleep with one eye 
open, bitch, the bad guy just got out of jail." R. 152:53. In addition, she testified that she 
also lost her job the following day after trial due to anonymous complaint being called in 
against her. R. 152:54. According to Ms. Crawmer's affidavit, Ms. Belt told her that the 
complaint came in from one of Defendant's friends and accused her of improperly 
accessing confidential information. R. 106. Ms. Crawmer described Ms. Belt as being 
distraught because she was concerned about getting money to support her children. R. 
106. Coincidentally, three days after these events occurred, Ms. Belt filed her affidavit 
with the court recanting her previous testimony. R. 70-74. As such, it is reasonable to 
infer that Ms. Belt's recantation was influenced by fear and financial distress which 
played a significant factor in the trial court's finding that it lacked credibility. 
2. Ms. Belt's recantation was highly suspect and dubious on its 
face. 
Post-trial evidence that is suspect on its face is unlikely to render a different result 
probable on retrial. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 114 P.3d 551 (Utah 2005). There, 
Pinder appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence. Id. at | 1. The newly discovered evidence at issue consisted of 
information that multiple witnesses now had to offer on a variety of issues. Id. at % 68. 
While the court found that some of the information from two of the witnesses could have 
been discoverable prior to trial, it addressed the trial court's credibility assessment of the 
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remaining witnesses to determine whether it would render a different result probable on 
retrial. Id. at fflj 70-75. 
With respect to those witnesses, the court agreed with the trial court's credibility 
assessment that the testimony was "highly suspect and not entitled to any significant 
weight/' and would not have made a different result probable. Id. at f 78. Like Ms. 
Belt, one witness5 "new" testimony was wholly inconsistent with his previous statement 
and the evidence at trial. Id. at If 79. The trial court found the "new" testimony lacked 
credibility because it was offered after the witness learned that Pinder had provided 
information to police which led to his incarceration. Id. The trial court made a similar 
finding with the other witness who also offered "new" testimony after he learned that 
Pinder provided information that led to his arrest. Id. at ^ 82. In addition, the trial court 
found that witness' testimony did not mesh with the physical evidence presented at trial. 
Id. at t 83. These findings were affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court which held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the presence of the testimony of 
these two witnesses would not make a more favorable outcome on retrial probable. Id. at 
184. 
Like the two witnesses in Pinder, Ms. Belt's recantation was highly suspect with 
respect to her account of what occurred outside of the courtroom on the day of trial. It is 
implausible to believe that Ms. Belt's screaming "at the top of her lungs" as she fell to 
her knees outside of the courtroom went unnoticed by any other person. R. 152:22. The 
Matheson Courthouse is generally bustling with people in the morning, especially on trial 
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days. The fact that nobody saw or heard Ms. Belt fall to her knees as she screamed at the 
top of her lungs renders her story highly suspect. 
••• Further., Ms. Belt filed her affidavit only five days after the trial. R. 70. Yet, 
despite this short turnaround, her recollection of the trial proceedings was completely 
inaccurate. She claimed that Ms. Crawmer put her statement in front of her and forced 
her to read it to the jury upon being questioned. R. 72. The record is clear that Ms. 
Crawmer did not even present Ms. Belt with her written statement until the end of her 
direct examination. R. 151:109. This raises suspicions as to whether Ms. Belt was 
genuinely mistaken, or simply furthering her already dubious recantation. Either way, 
the suspect nature of her recantation supports the trial court's credibility assessment and a 
finding that it would not have rendered a different result more probable on retrial. 
3. Ms. Belt's recantation lacked corroborating evidence and 
was refuted by the State's evidence, 
Ms. Belt's recantation also lacked any credible corroborating evidence. The only 
other witness considered by the trial court in favor of Ms. Belt's recantation was 
Defendant's mother, Jeanie Williams. She testified that she was present in the back row 
of the courtroom during the jury trial, and heard Ms. Belt crying outside of the courtroom 
and stating that she did not want to go in. R. 152:75-76. Most striking about this 
testimony was the fact that she was not disclosed as a witness prior to the evidentiary 
hearing and was in the courtroom when Ms. Belt testified about her recantation. R. 
152:75. The trial court found the testimony of Ms. Williams to be biased in favor of 
Defendant's motion and not helpful either. R. 153:13. Given her relationship to 
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Defendant and the lack of significant detail she offered in support of Ms. Belt's 
recantation, this finding was reasonable. 
If anything, the testimony of Ms. Williams supported Ms. Belt's original fears of 
testifying just as much as it supported her recantation. The morning of jury trial, Ms. 
Crawmer received a phone call from Ms. Belt and described her as fearful of coming into 
court. R. 105. In addition, Michael Riquino testified Ms. Belt expressed fear of seeing 
Defendant in court and asked him to check the hallways when she needed to use the 
bathroom. R. 152:92, 94. Notwithstanding the trial court's assessment of Ms. Williams' 
testimony, the testimony itself did not add to or necessarily support Ms. Belt's 
recantation. Ms. Belt was clearly fearful of being in the courtroom with Defendant, and 
the crying Ms. Williams allegedly heard outside of the courtroom could have very well 
been related to that fear. 
Further, the lack of additional evidence that could have been presented supports 
the trial court's finding that Ms. Belt's recantation lacked credibility. Ms. Belt, Ms. 
Crawmer, and Mr. Riquino all recalled Ms. Belt's sister being present with her during the 
jury trial. R. 105, 109, 152:22. Although Ms. Belt's sister was present with her during 
the jury trial, she did not provide any testimony in support of Ms. Belt's allegations of 
what purportedly transpired outside of the courtroom doors. Clearly, she would have 
been able to provide corroborative evidence in support of the allegations lodged against 
Ms. Crawmer. Further, Defendant offered no testimony corroborating Ms. Belt's 
explanation that her injury was sustained while they were rearranging furniture. Instead, 
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his only testimony concerning her injury occurred at jury trial where he stated that he did 
not know how she injured her leg. R. 151:183. 
Finally, the testimony of Ms. Crawmer and Mr. Riquino further support the trial 
court's finding. At the motion hearing, Defendant's attorney was given the opportunity 
to cross examine Ms. Crawmer on her recollection of the case, yet declined the invitation. 
R. 152:89. Consequently, the trial court found Ms. Crawmer's testimony to be "credible 
and reliable." R. 153:13-14. In short, Ms. Crawmer testified that at no point prior to her 
testimony at trial did Ms. Belt state that she made a false report to the police. R. 152:87. 
Further, Ms. Crawmer stated that she never threatened Ms. Belt with prosecution should 
she not testify. R. 152:87. She also did not coached Ms. Belt to read from her witness 
statement during trial. R. 152:87. Finally, she denied lifting Ms. Belt off of the ground 
and physically forcing her into the courtroom after she fell to her knees, allegedly 
screaming at the top of her lungs. R. 152:22-23. Because Ms. Crawmer's testimony was 
barely disputed by Defendant, it should be given significant weight when determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Ms. Belt's recantation to lack 
credibility. 
Similarly, the trial court found Mr. Riquino's testimony to be disinterested and 
significant because he was the only witness who did not have a 'side' in the case. R. 
153:14. Mr. Riquino's testimony corroborated Ms. Crawmer's refutation of the 
allegations that she physically forced Ms. Belt into the courtroom to testify. R. 152:91. 
Further, Mr. Riquino testified that he was present with Ms. Belt and Ms. Crawmer the 
day before trial, and at no point did Ms. Belt state that she made a false statement to the 
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police. R. 152:90-91. This evidence only strengthened the trial court's finding that Ms. 
Belt's recantation lacked credibility. 
For these reasons, the trial court was well within its discretion to make a finding 
that Ms. Belt's recantation lacked credibility when it denied Defendant's motion for new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence. Ms. Belt was influenced by threats and 
financial distress when she recanted her testimony days after the verdict. Her recantation 
was dubious and highly suspect on its face. Further, Defendant presented no additional 
evidence which supported her recantation, and the evidence refuting it was significant 
and credible. Because of its superior position in assessing credibility, all of these 
considerations demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding her 
recantation incredible. If a jury were to weigh Ms. Belt's recantation in light of these 
circumstances, it would not be probable that they would come to a different result at 
retrial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
B. Ms. Belt's willingness to commit perjury did not abrogate the trial 
court of its role in assessing her credibility. 
Defendant does not appear to challenge the trial court's finding that Ms. Belt's 
recantation lacked credibility. Instead, he argues that the important issue presented in 
this case is the fact that Ms. Belt committed perjury either during trial or at the 
evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Brief, pg. 17. This position is flawed because it 
essentially suggests that a new trial is warranted even if the newly discovered evidence 
consists of perjured testimony that is the product of post-trial witness tampering. More 
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importantly, such a position gives little credence to the trial court's credibility assessment 
of the perjured testimony which is inconsistent with prior case law. See Loose 2000 UT 
11,118. 
Defendant points to State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), in support of his 
position that Ms. Belt's willingness to commit perjury is of such an exceedingly high 
impeachment value that it would have made the jury view her testimony differently at 
retrial. Appellant's Brief, pg. 15. In James, it was discovered after trial that one of the 
prosecution's key witnesses in fact committed perjury during the jury trial. James at 794. 
With respect to its impact on the witness' credibility, the court stated: 
"While it is true that the refusal to grant a new trial based merely on 
evidence of credibility will not be overturned on appeal, the credibility 
evidence went beyond refuting the testimony of Peterson and established 
independent evidence that he had deliberately committed perjury in an 
attempt to subvert the trial process." 
Id. Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court's denial of James' motion for new trial, 
holding that without the perjured testimony, it was probable that a reasonable jury would 
have had a reasonable doubt as to James' requisite intent to commit murder. Id. at 795. 
Defendant also refers to State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 44 P.3d 805, in support of 
the same position. Appellant's Brief, pg. 17. In Martin, the newly discovered evidence 
at issue was information that the victim had previously accepted a car ride from a 
stranger, as she did with Martin before she was allegedly raped. Id. at \ 25. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Martin's motion for new trial, holding 
that the new evidence went to the central issue in the case relating to the credibility of the 
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parties and may constitute the difference between conviction and acquittal. Id. at fflf 49-
50. 
Ms. Belt's recantation is easily distinguishable from the newly discovered 
evidence described in James and Martin. In both of those cases, neither the trial court 
nor the prosecution challenged the truthfulness of the newly discovered evidence. In 
James, it was undisputed that the witness did in fact commit perjury during trial. James 
at 794. In Martin, it was undisputed that the victim did in fact previously accept a ride 
from a stranger. Martin at \ 26. Here, it is disputed whether Ms. Belt's recantation is 
truthful. While Defendant's conviction hinged primarily on the jury's credibility 
assessment of Ms. Belt and Defendant, there was no independent, newly discovered 
evidence that would have called Ms. Belt's credibility into question as in James and 
Martin. Further, the Martin case lacked corroborative evidence. Id. at f 2. Here, there 
was photographic evidence of Ms. Belt's injury admitted to the jury which was consistent 
with her testimony at trial as well as Officer Julius' description of her appearance and 
demeanor. R. 151:116, 159. The lack of independent, newly discovered evidence 
challenging Ms. Belt's trial testimony renders James and Martin distinguishable and of 
minimal persuasive value in support of Defendant's position. 
From a policy perspective, it reasonable for a trial court to assess the credibility of 
a victim's post-trial recantation, even if that recantation is made under oath and in 
contradiction to prior testimony given at trial. In the context of a domestic violence case 
such as this, it is not out of the realm of possibility for a victim who cooperated with the 
prosecution at trial to be coerced into recanting her testimony later. Awarding a 
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convicted defendant with a new trial for simply succeeding in persuading the victim to 
recant under oath would be a mockery to our justice system. It would re-victimize the 
victim. It is wholly appropriate for the trial court to assess the credibility of the 
potentially perjured recantation in considering whether the defendant's rights have been 
so violated to warrant a new trial. Here, the trial court was well within its discretion to 
find that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because of the incredible nature of Ms. 
Belt's recantation. Accordingly, its decision should not be reversed on the sole fact that 
Ms. Belt was willing to commit perjury in her recantation. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Despite not challenging Ms. Crawmer's affidavit or testimony during the 
evidentiary hearing, Defendant still asserts that he is entitled to a new trial based on the 
incredible accusations lodged by Ms. Belt against Ms. Crawmer of witness intimidation. 
To award Defendant a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must 
find that not only did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Belt's testimony to 
be incredible, it also abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Crawmer and Mr. Riquino's 
testimony to be credible and reliable. See State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264,f10, 167 
P.3d 516 (applying abuse of discretion standard when reviewing denial of motion for new 
trial due to prosecutorial misconduct). 
Under Utah law, "when a prosecutor is aware that testimony false, he or she has a 
duty to correct the false impression; failure to do so requires reversal if there is any 
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reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury." State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 116 (Utah App. 1994). Further, "witness 
intimidation by a prosecutor can warrant a new trial if it resulted in a denial of 
defendant's right to a fair trial." Owens, 753 P.2d at 978. Of course, these rules 
governing prosecutorial misconduct are only applicable if there is credible evidence that 
such conduct actually occurred. 
In this case, the only evidence of prosecutorial misconduct is the testimony offered 
by Ms. Belt. As already discussed at length, the trial court reasonably found Ms. Belt's 
testimony to lack credibility for many reasons. In addition, the trial court found Ms. 
Crawmer's testimony refuting the allegations that she engaged in witness intimidation to 
be reliable and credible. R. 153:14. In support of this finding, the trial court reasonably 
found Mr. Riquino's testimony to be of special significance because he did not have an 
interest in the outcome. R. 153:14. 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's credibility assessments of both Ms. 
Crawmer and Mr. Riquino. Instead, he pins his argument solely on the position that Ms. 
Belt was willing to subject herself to perjury to set the record straight, therefore 
enhancing her credibility. Appellant's Brief, pg. 19. Such an argument does not amount 
to any showing that the trial court abused its discretion or erred in denying his motion for 
new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. The evidence refuting Ms. Belt's 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct more than justified the trial court's 
determinations. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
trial court's denial of Defendant's motions seeking an arrest of judgment or a new trial. 
Respectftilly submitted this September 13,2011. 
Sim Gill 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
shuaN:<}raves 
Deputy District Attorney 
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